What can one learn from a negative popular verdict? by Besson, Samantha
[S4] IUS GENTIUM · Fall 2001 
What Can One Learn From A 
Negative Popular Verdict? 
Samantha Besson* 
Queen's College, Oxford 
On 12th March, 2000, 82% of the Swiss people re-
jected a popular initiative 'For a fair representation of 
women in federal authorities' .1 
This initiative proposed that the Federal Constitu-
tion be amended in order to introduce a rigid 50% 
quota of women elected to federal authorities. This 
meant in practice that each canton (one of the 26 sov-
ereign states of the Swiss Confederation) would elect 
one woman and one man to the Council of States 
("Conseil des Etats", one of the two chambers of the 
Federal Assembly, i.e. the Swiss parliament) and that, 
in the National Council ("Conseil national", the sec-
ond chamber of the Federal Assembly) the difference 
between the number of men and women elected from 
each canton could not be superior to one. The Federal 
' Many thanks to the Swiss National Fund for Scientific Re-
search without whose support I could not have pursued this re-
search. 
1 FF 1999 V 4656. In the Swiss semi-direct democracy, there 
are two types of constitutional initiatives: popular ones which 
are launched by a sufficient number of citizens and are submitted 
to a popular vote (art. 139 Cst.) and parliamentary ones that are 
issued by a parliamentary group and are dealt with within the 
federal Assembly (art. 160 Cst.). 
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Council ("Conseil federal", i.e. the Swiss executive) 
would be composed of at least three women out of 
seven members and the Federal Tribunal ("Tribunal 
federal", Le. the Swiss supreme court) of at least forty 
percent women. 
Faced with this radical and rigid conception of equal-
ity, both the Federal Council and the Federal Assem-
bly recommended that the people reject the initiative, 
without even offering a more flexible and proportion-
ate counter-project to the voters; according to the vot-
ing instructions, such representation quotas would 
violate, on the one hand, the principle of equality and, 
on the other, the right to vote. A clear-cut popular 
verdict confirmed the Federal Council's view that the 
underrepresentation of women in politics is a social 
problem that cannot be solved through legal means 
and in particular not through the introduction of rigid 
quotas of representation. 
In this paper I would like to show why political quo-
tas and paritary rights for women are needed as much 
in Switzerland as in France, what flexible and propor-
tionate form they could take and how they could relate 
coherently to the existing guarantees of the principle 
of material equality in Swiss law and to other institu-
tions such as the federal system of proportional repre-
sentation. To do so, after making (I) a few general ob-
servations on the concepts of positive action and quo-
tas, I will discuss (II) the Swiss legal regime of equality 
between men and women including (III) the recent 
developments and debates about the introduction of 
quotas and paritary rights. I will conclude (IV) with a 
brief assessment of the future of political quotas in 
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Switzerland after their paradoxical rejection by the 
people. 
I. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE CONCEPTS 
OF POSITIVE ACTION AND QUOTAS 
In this paper, measures of positive action or, simpler, 
positive measures2 are measures which intentionally 
use gender-conscious criteria in order to favour 
women and to correct past disadvantages.3 
The term designates a variety of measures.4 These 
encompass most famously preferential measures when 
hiring or electing people according to their sex, i.e. 
quotas in a broad sense ("quotas imperatifs", 
"Forderungsmassnahmen"). The terminology is not 
strict and in fact quite vague. 5 One should note, for 
instance, that whereas French law has chosen to use 
the term 'paritary rights' for 50% quotas, this term is 
almost unknown to Swiss law. 
2 On the appellation and its scope, AUER A., Les mesures posi-
tives et !'art. 4 al. 2 Cst., PJA 11/1993 p. 1336 ff. 
3 FRED.MANS., Reversing Discrimination, (1997) 113 LQR p. 
575 ff. ; MCCRUDDEN C., The Constitutionality of Affirmative Ac-
tion In the United States: A Casenote on Adarand v. Pena, 
(1996) 2 IJDL p. 369 ff. 
4 See MCCRUDDEN C., Rethinking Positive Action, (1986) 15 
ILJ p. 219 ff., 223 ff. See also ATF 123 I 152/160 f. cons. 4 b), SJ 
1997 656*. See also VOGEL-POLSKY E., Les actions positives, Jes 
quotas au crible du drolt de l'egalite, Jes quotas, mode d'emploi, 
limites et derives du systeme des quotas sexues, in: Arioli K. 
(ed.), Quoten und Glelchstellung von Frau und Mann, 
Bfile/Francfort-sur-le-Main 1996, p. 127 ff. 
5 For a comparative discussion of the American, European 
and Swiss approaches to positive measures, see BESSON S., Mesu-
res positives: le nouvel equilibre asymetrique, Perspectives pour 
le drolt suisse, PJA 4/1999 p. 390 ff. 
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· It is useful to draw a few distinctions among prefer-
ential positive measures or quotas: first, the reference 
to attributive characteristics, like sex, within the gen-
eral evaluation of the qualifications of a candidate 
("goals", "quotas decisionnels", "Entscheidungs-
quoten''); and, second, the usage of 'quotas' stricto 
sensu ("result quotas", "quotas de resultat", "Ergeb-
nisquoten"6). It is possible to distinguish two forms of 
quotas stricto sensu:7 first, the preference given to sex 
in case of 'tie-break', that is the case where two 
equally qualified candidates are competing and where 
women are underrepresented in the sector at stake 
("flexible quotas", "quotas souples", ''flexible 
Quoten"); second, the preference given to members of 
a group independently of the candidates' qualifica-
tions ("rigid quotas", "quotas rigides", "starre 
Quoten"). 
II. THE REGIME OF EQUALITY 
1. The Principle of Equality in General 
The consecration of the principle of equality in the 
Swiss legal order is one of the fruits of the bourgeois 
6 On the distinction, see BIGLER-EGGENBERGER/KAUFMANN 
(eds), Kommentar zum Gleichstellungsgesetz, Biile/Francfort-sur-
le-Main 1997, n. 1S4 ff. . . 
7 On the distinction, see BENDA E., Notwendigkeit und Mo-
glichkeit positiver Aktionen zugunsten von Frauen im offentli-
chen Dienst, Rechtsgutachten erstattet im Auftrag der Senats-
kanzlei - Leitstelle Gleichstellung der Frau - der Freien und Han-
sestadt Hamburg, Freiburg i. Brisg. 1986, p. 43 ff. ; ARIOU K., 
Frauenforderungsmassnahmen im Erwerbsleben, Zurich 1992, p. 
146 ff.; KAUFMANN C., Les quotas valent mieux que leur reputa-
tion, in: Morand C.A. (ed.), L'egal!te entre hommes et femmes, 
Lausanne 1987, p. 27 4 ff. · 
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revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries. Until the 
revision of the Federal Constitution in 1999 the prin-
ciple was guaranteed by art. 4 of the 184B Federal 
Constitution (aCst.). 
Since 1999, the principfo of equality has .been guar-
ai:,.teed by art. 8 of the new Constitution (Cst.). It en-
tails four paragraphs. The first paragraph guarantees 
the principle of equality within and before the law. 
The second paragraph expresses the corollary princi-
ple of non-discrimination and provides · a non-
exhaustive list of different criteria of discrimination 
that are prohibited. The third paragraph entrenches 
the principle of equality between men and women. 
And the fourth paragraph gives a mandate to the legis-
lator for the elimination of all inequalities suffered by 
disabled people. 
In addition to the Federal provisions, most cantonal 
constitutions also guarantee the principle of equality. 
According to the principle of the derogatory force of 
federal law, the cantonal guarantees of equality only 
exert an independent influence when their scope of 
protection is broader than the federal guarantee.8 For 
the sake of clarity, my discussion here will concentrate 
onfederal law. 
Note that the Swiss legal order is monistic and that 
international law is therefore directly binding for na-
tional authorities. Thus, whereas there is no judicial 
review of federal law in Swiss law, the Federal Tribunal 
must ensure respect for international guarantees of 
8 ATF 119 Ia S3, SS= JdT 199S I 30S. 
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equality within the application of federal law. This is 
particularly the case for art; 14 of the European Con-
vention of Human Rights (ECHR), the UN Human 
Rights Pacts and the 1979 International Convention on 
the elimination of all forms of discrimination of 
women. However, given the lack of independence of 
those guarantees9, and the limited role of the principle 
of material equality in those instruments more gener-
ally, stronger protections of Swiss women's paritary 
rights cannot be clearly derived from them. 
2. The Principle of Equality Between Men and 
Women 
The general principle of equality of art. 4 par. 1 aCst. 
was for a long time the only constitutional guarantee 
that could be used to fight inequalities between men 
and women. As such it hardly offered sufficient protec-
tion.10 It is only since 1981, as the result of a popular 
initiative, that the Swiss Constitution has offered an 
independent guarantee of the principle of equality be-
tween men and women. This principle used to be en-
trenched in the second paragraph of art. 4 aCst. It has 
now become the third paragraph of art. 8 Cst. 
This principle has been applied extensively since 
1981 in all realms of life, and in particular in the do-
mains of political rights, social security and private law 
where severe gender-based11 inequalities were progres-
9 See ACEDH Petrovic, 27•h March 1998, Rec. 1998 II 67, 579, 
par. 22. 
10 ATF 49 I 14, 19. 
11 Please note that I am indifferently using 'gender' for 'sex' in 
this essay. 
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sively eliminated; thus, the principle was applied in 
1992 to partly invalidate the Constitution of the Can-
ton of Appenzell because art. 16 gave men alone the 
right to vote.12 
Art. 8 par. 3 Cst. contains three phrases. The first 
and last phrases confer directly justiciable constitu-
tional rights, whereas the second one gives a mandate 
to the legislator.13 Art. 8 par. 3 Cst.'s first phrase re-
peats art. 8 par. 1 Cst.'s principle of equality before the 
law in the context of equality between men and 
women. Art. 8 par. 3 Cst.'s second phrase gives to the 
communal, cantonal and federal legislators the man-
date to promote equality under and before the law as 
well as material equality, in particular in the realms of 
family, training and labour. Art. 8 par. 3 Cst.'s third 
phrase establishes the right to equal pay for work of 
similar value, both in the public and the private 
spheres. 
3. The Mandate To Realize Equality Between Men 
and Women 
Art. 8 par. 3 phr. 2 Cst.'s mandate requires that the 
legislator, on the one hand, eliminate all discrimina-
tions on the grounds of sex from existing legislation 
and, on the other, adopt all necessary measures to 
further the material equality.between men and women 
in society. 
12 ATF 116 la 259=JdT 1992 I 98. 
13 ATF 114 Ia 331 ; 117 Ia 265. 
ms GENTIUM · Volume 7 [61) 
Samantha Besson 
Since 1981, many federal laws (e.g. the Civil Code 
and in particular the rules on the rights and duties of 
spouses, the Federal Law on the acquisition of the 
Swiss nationality through marriage and the Federal 
Law on old age pensions) were revised accordingly. In 
1995, the Federal Law on the Equality between men 
and women (Loifederale sur l'egalite entre hommes et 
femmes, LEg.) was adopted. 
The idea encapsulated in this mandate is twofold. It 
ensures, on the one hand, a certain amount of com-
plementarity between the judicial response to viola-
tions of equality and legislative powers that can elimi-
nate some discriminations which never appear in 
court or which, even if they do, cannot be declared 
unconstitutional given the absence of constitutional 
judicial review of federal law.14 It is therefore the legis-
lator's, and not the judge's task to decide which meas-
ures to adopt or to amend to ensure true equality in 
society; this emphasis on the legislative protection as 
opposed to constitutional control is an important ele-
ment of contrast between the French and the Swiss 
regimes of equality. On the other hand, the legislative 
mandate also reflects the wish to see measures of pro-
motion of material equality established on a formal 
legal basis .15 
The mandate is imperative. Despite the strict delimi-
tation of competence set by art. 8 par. 3 phr. 2 Cst., 
14 See ATF 117 Ia 262, 264. See also AUERIMARTENET, Les 
quotas, la democratle et le federalisme, SJ 35/1997 p. 629 ff., 
636. 
15 See AUERIMARTENET, above n. 14, p. 635. 
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cantonal legislative inactivity can be sanctioned in 
court as a violation of art. 8 par. 3 phr. 1 Cst;16 
4. Positive Measures 
a. The Constitution 
Not only does art. 8 par. 3 phr. 2 Cst. require the leg-
islator to ensure the concretization of equality under 
and before the law, but it also mentions the impor-
tance of furthering material equality between men and 
women. In this sense, the Swiss regime of equality 
contrasts with the French tmiversalist regime of formal 
equality before the law. 
Given that positive measures amount to one of the 
ways of furthering material equality between men and 
women, a priori nothing in the Constitution seems to 
prevent this mandate from constituting a ready-made 
constitutional basis for the adoption of positive meas-
ures and, in particular, of quotasY It is also true, how-
ever, that the mandate does not clearly mention them 
either.18 
The question ofthe harmonization and reconcilia-
tion of the two facets and phrases of art. 8 par. 3 Cst. 
is a controversial one ; although it is true that the first 
phrase prohibits any formal discrimination based on 
16 ATF 116 lb 270, 283 = JdT 1993 I 117. 
17 AUER, above n. 2, p. 1338 ff. ; EPINEYIREFAIL, 
Chancengleichheit, eln teilbarer Begriff?, PJA 3/1996 p. 183 ff., 
186; 
18 See FF 1993 I 1321 f.; MUELLER J.P., Grundrechte in der 
Schwelz, 3rd edn, Berne 1999, p. 449. 
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sex, except in cases where biological or functional dif-
ferences related to sex matter objectively19, and this in 
favour of women or of men20 ("Differenzierungsver-
bot" or "Gleichbehandlungsgebot"), the second phrase 
gives a mandate to the legislator for the promotion of 
the material equality of women only ("Gleichstel-
lungsgebot"). 
For some authors, a broad and material interpreta-
tion of art. 8 par. 3 Cst. that includes positive meas-
ures would be contradictory.21 At first sight, indeed, 
positive measures seem to contravene theformal prin-
ciple of equality before the law of art. 8 par. 3 phr. 1 
Cst.22 
However, to read art. 8 par. 3 Cst. this way would be 
simplistic23 because positive measures do not amount 
19 See ATF 125 I 21, 24. BIGLER-EGGENBERGER/KAUFMANN, 
above n. 6, n. 168 ; TOBLER C., Quoten und das Verstiindnis der 
Rechtsgleichheit der Geschlechter Im schweizerischen Verfas-
sungsrecht, unter vergleichender Beriicksichtigung der EuGH-
Entscheidung Kalanke, in: Arioli K. (ed.), Frauenforderung <lurch 
Quoten, Bale 1997, p. 49 ff., 85. 
20 See MUELLER G., Kommentar zu Art. 4 BV in: Kommentar 
zur Bundesverfassung der schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft 
vom 29. Mai 1874, Loseblattausgabe, Bale/Zurich/Berne 1987-
1996, n. 133; SCHWANDERM., Bundesgerichtliche Rechtsprechung 
zu Artikel 4 Abs. 2 der Bundesverfassung und die Frage der Ver-
fassungsmiissigkeit von Frauenquoten, PJA 811997 p. 963 ff., 974. 
See on the denunciation of this neutralizing interpretation of the 
principle of equality in Swiss law, AUER, above n. 2, p. 1339 ff. 
and MUELLER, above n. 18, p. 457. See ATF 123 I 56. 
21 See GRISEL E., Egalite des sexes et quotas de representa-
tion, in: Ehrenzeller B. et alii (eds), Der Verfassungsstaat vor 
neuen Herausforderungen, Festschrift filr Yvo Hangartner, St Gall 
1998, p. 539 f. 
22 See EPINEY A., Umgekehrte Diskriminierung, Cologne 1995, 
p. 19 f. and ARIOLI, above n. 7, p. 65 ff. 
23 See AGACINSKI S., Politique des sexes, precede de Mise au 
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to a complete exception to the principle of equality. 24 
On the contrary, they are an integral part of it.25 Prin-
ciples of formal equality and non-discrimination do 
not always ensure true equality between the sexes in 
cases where differentiations are deeply rooted in social 
reality. The correction of material inequalities there-
fore justifies the adoption of special measures,· even 
when these amount to an intentional discrimination 
against members of the dominant and privileged group. 
Thus, the principle prohibiting sex discrimination 
should itself be understood as requiring the protection 
of women, qua underrepresented and historically dis-
advantaged group, and not of men who are sufficiently 
protected by the general principle of equality of art. 8 
par. 1 Cst.26 Actual consequences of past discrimina-
tion based on sex call for a distinction between damag-
ing discrimination and discrimination that redresses 
past wrongs.27 
point sur la mixite, Paris 2001, p. 193, 101: 'Prendre en compte 
theoriquement et pratiquement, la difference des sexes ne repre-
sente ainsi aucun abandon de !'universe!, mais, au contraire, 
permet de reconnaitre le contenu concret et differencie de 
!'universe!.' 
24 See TOBLER C., Frauenforderung <lurch Quoten und Rech-
tsgleichheit der Geschlechter, oder: 'Es ist zum Besten der Ge-
sellschaft, wenn die Wertauffassungen der Frauen und !hr Ge-
rechtigkeitssinn Tei! der Politik werden', recht 3/1998 p. 100 ff., 
111; GIANFORMAGGIO L., Equalanza formale e sostanziale. II 
grando equivoco, II Foro Italiano 1996 p. 1961 ff., 1974; 
SACKOFSKY U., Die verfassunsrechtliche Beurteilung von Quoten-
regelungen, in: Arioli K. (ed.), Quoten und Gleichstellung von 
Mann und Frau, Bale!Francfort-sur-le-Main 1996, p. 23 ff., 27. 
25 See TOBLER, above n. 19, p. 51 ff. 
26 See MUELLER, above n. 18, p. 455 f. 
27 DWORKIN R., A Matter of Principle, Cambridge Mass. 1985, 
p. 314. See MACKINNON C.A., Difference and Dominance: On Sex 
Discrimination, in: Barlett/Kennedy (eds), Feminist Legal Theory, 
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One may therefore at least contend, with most au-
thors, that art. 8 par. 3 phr. 2 Cst. allows the Confed-
eration to adopt measures of positive action;28 their 
justification in the public interest would allow for the 
restriction of fundamental individual rights and of the 
principle of formal equality, provided that there is a 
legal basis, a sufficient public interest and that the 
measures respect the principle of proportionality. 29 
In 1991, the Federal Tribunal finally established that 
the constitutional guarantee of gender equality of art. 
8 par. 3 phr. 2 Cst. does not promote material equality 
sufficiently when it is interpreted too formalistically.30 
This decision has since then been confirmed and the 
adoption of positive measures can now be founded di-
rectly on art. 8 par. 3 phr. 2 Cst.31 
b. The law on equality between men and women 
Since the adoption of the Equality Law in 1995, the 
concept of positive measures has become an objective 
Readings in Law and Gender, San Francisco/Oxford 1991, p. 81 
ff., 89. 
28 See MUELLER, above n. 20, n. 73 ff. ; BIGLER-
EGGENBERGERIKAUFMANN, above n. 6, n. 168. See also 
HANGARTNER. Y., Umstrittene Frauenforderung : Chancengleich-
heit oder Quotengleichheit ? , RJB 132/1996 p. 355 ff. 
29 See AUER, above n. 2, p. 1344 ff.; HANGARTNER Y., Gleicher 
Zugang von Miinnern und Frauen zu offentlichen Aemtern, PJA 
11/1995 p. 1554 ff., 1558; SCHWANDER CLAUSM., Verfassungsmiis-
sigkeit von Frauenquoten, Berne 1995. 
30 See AUER, above n. 2, p. 1342 f.; TOBLER, above n. 24, p. 
110. 
31 ATF 125 I 21, 25. 
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part of Swiss law. Art. 3 par. 3 LEg. states that meas-
ures that promote material equality between men and 
women are not discriminatory.32 
The exception of art. 3 par. 3 LEg. does not, how-
ever, render positive measures automatically constitu-
tional. 33 True, it allows one to regard positive measures 
as not a priori contrary to art. 8 par. 3 Cst.34 Their 
constitutionality, however, must still be established in 
each case. 
Besides, the Equality Law's title makes it easy to for-
get that it only applies to labour relations and that its 
scope cannot be extended outside of that realm. 
c. A few examples 
During the past ten years, positive measures have 
been introduced in various public and pri'Vate do-
mains. The most important innovations so far have 
concerned the promotion of women in the family, the 
access to public education and to the ci'Vil service. 
Access to the public service and public functions was 
strengthened by the Federal Council's instructions on 
the improvement of representation and the profes-
32 See BIGLER-EGGENBERGER/KAUFMANN, above n. 6, n. 169 ; 
TOBLER, above n. 24, p. 110. 
33 See MADER L., Das Gleichstellungsgesetz-Entstehung, Ziele 
und lnstrumente, in: Schwander/Schaffhauser (eds), Das Bundes-
gesetz fiber die Gleichstellung von Frauen und Miinner, St Gall 
1996, p. 10 ss, 26. 
34 See ATF 125 I 21/29 f. cons. 3 d) aa) (nt). 
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sional situation of female civil servants in the federal 
administration. 35 
Of course, the question of the constitutionality of 
positive measures is even more acute in the political 
realm. It is to representation quotas of women in po-
litical elections and mandates that I will turn now. 
Ill. POLITICAL QUOTAS 
1. The context 
For the past ten years now, political quotas have 
seemed to many to be an adequate means to promote 
material equality between men and women. This idea 
arose in response to two main arguments. 
a. The underrepresentation of women in politics 
Political power enables citizens to make a difference 
in different areas of social life and women· have a right 
to make this difference as much as men. However, al-
though women constitute a majority in the Swiss 
population, their representation in political institu-
tions, both at the federal and cantonal levels, only 
amounts to one- fifth of the posts. 
One reason for this state of affairs is that women do 
not· have the same chances of being elected as men. 
From 1848, the date of the creation of the modern 
Swiss Confederation, to 1971, politics were made ex-
clusively for and by men. It was only on 7th February, 
35 FF 1992 II p. 604. 
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1971, i.e. twenty-seven years after French women, that 
Swiss women gained the right to vote and be elected in 
federal elections. Since then, however, despite their 
technical eligibility, women have remained a small 
minority within political organs. Although the number 
of elected women has been multiplied by five in thirty 
years, at this rate women would have to wait until 
2040 to obtain full parity. 
b. The existence of a system of proportional rep-
resentation in Swiss law 
By contrast to the French tradition of universalism, 
the Swiss constitutional order has entailed and applied 
quotas of proportional representation since 1919; this 
system has helped. to maintain the proportions of po-
litical and linguistic groups in the different federal in-
stitutions more or less in proportion to their percent-
age in the population.36 This system is affectionately 
called the 'magic formula' and it is the cement that 
makes the cooperation of so many different communi-
ties possible. 
The introduction of gender-based political quotas 
would not therefore be something foreign to the Swiss 
democratic order, since the constitutional order al-
ready recognizes representativeness-based infringe-
ments on the right to vote. An instructive analogy can 
be drawn with Belgium where the introduction· of list 
36 For instance, art. 84 par. 2 of the Constitution of the Can-
ton of Bern foresees one seat in the executive for representatives 
of the Berner Jura, which is a francophone region of the canton. 
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quotas was eased by the fact that linguistic quotas 
were already entrenched. 
Of course, these forms of proportional or descrip-
tive37 representation remain controversial outside of a 
specific federal context. According to one of the main 
objections, 'no one would argue that morons should be 
represented by morons', .so why argue that women 
would be better represented by women if some male 
candidates have a greater ability to represent the sub-
stantive interests of their constituents. 
This objection is not conclusive. First of all, my ar-
gument is not essentialist, but a merely historically 
contingent one; it is based on redressing past exclu-
sion and the lack of representation of the diversity of 
the people as a whole by its political institutions, 
rather than on the need for a separate representation 
of each gender. Secondly, disadvantaged groups often 
need the full representation that proportionality allows 
in order to achieve deliberative synergy. For instance, 
some issues had never been considered in politics be-
fore women brought them to the legislative table. Fi-
nally, descriptive representation of women might en-
hance the construction of the social meaning of the 
gender characteristic; this might shape the recognition 
of the equal capacity to rule of women. Another re-
lated argument is based on the higher legitimacy of 
the law that will flow from a better representation of 
women in politics. 
37 The term 'descriptive representation' was first coined by 
PITKIN H., The concept of representation, Harvard 1972. 
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2. The Reactions to The Limits of The System 
Faced with the constitutional mandate to further ma-
terial equality and adopt positive measures when nec-
essary, the limitations on the electoral chances of 
women that are built into the electoral system and the 
constitutional possibility of inserting a further criteria 
of proportional representation in the so-called 'magic 
formula', many have called for the adoption of political 
quotas as a perfect corrective. 
a. The '3rd .March' Initiative 
i. The proposal 
Many popular initiatives in favor of political quotas 
of seats have been put together during the past ten 
years, but none ever gathered a sufficient number of 
signatures to be officially submitted. 38 
The most recent was launched by feminist groups 
and the committee 'Women in the Federal Council'. 
The. so-called . 'For a fair representation of women in 
federal authorities'. initiative was put together after the 
scandal that followed the non-election of one of the 
first female French-speaking candidates to the Federal 
Council, on 3rd March, 1993, hence its name '3rd March 
Initiative'. In order to promote a fair representation of 
women within federal authorities, the initiative pro-
posed a constitutional amendment to impose a 50% 
quota of women in elected office. 
38 See In particular the popular Initiatives 'Women and Men': 
FF 1990 III 164 and 'National Council 2000': FF 1991 I 99. 
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ii. The official reaction 
Both the Federal Council and the Parliament rec-
ommended that the people reject the initiative.39 Ac-
cording to the Federal Council's message and its voting 
recommendations, the proposed quotas of elected 
women were too rigid a solution to the problem of fe-
male underrepresentation in politics. In fact, it was 
such a stringent solution that no other European coun-
try had yet adopted it. 
The Federal Council's arguments were the following. 
First, in eliminating a material discrimination, the 
proposed scheme would create another formal one. 
Quotas violate the right to be treated equally as other 
candidates without regard to their gender. Second, 
rigid quotas infringe the voting liberty and the free 
choice of electors. Not all votes would have the same 
weight, depending on whether they were given to a 
female or a male candidate. Third, according to the 
Federal Council, although the initiative had a legiti-
mate aim, its means were too restrictive. The under-
representation of women in politics is a social problem 
that calls for in-depth measures and not quotas. Work 
should be done by the legislator in eliminating mate-
rial inequalities before they appear in the political in-
stitutions, e.g. in the family, education and labour 
realms. Fourth, if women are still underrepresented 
in political institutions, the Federal Council contends 
that their number is in constant increase. It would 
therefore be best to leave to political parties the volun-
39 FF 1997 III 489; FF 1999 V 4656. 
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tary task of making sure that women are fairly repre-
sented in their organs and on electoral lists. Finally, 
according to the Federal Council, the comparison of 
women with other minorities that are taken care of in 
the Swiss proportional representation system is not 
relevant. Women are not a minority and have other 
means to further their political representation. 
The first two arguments, that are based on the prin-
ciple of equality and the liberty to vote, are important 
and understandable arguments given the rigidity and 
lack of proportionality of the quotas proposed. The 
same is not true of the Federal Council's other argu-
ments, however. 
True, positive measures in the educational and eco-
nomic spheres are desirable, but they are mere ena-
bling devices that still need more stringent action to 
overcome the obstacles to full political representation. 
To quote a member of the initiative committee, 
'maybe we need more kindergartens before women can 
enter politics, but maybe there will be more kindergar-
tens once women have entered politics.' Leaving 
women to the vagaries of the "free market" of party 
competition is not enough. 
Moreover, the French example shows that it is not 
true that such measures would have made Switzerland 
the sole European country to have quotas. In fact, the 
comparison with neighboring countries, whose models 
of equality are more universalist than the Swiss model, 
is not relevant given the Swiss proportional system's 
specificity and art. 8 par. 3 phr. 2 Cst.'s legislative 
mandate to ensure the material equality of women. 
Besides, the initiative fulfilled the criteria of validity 
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developed by the French Constitutional Council, i.e. a 
constitutional basis and. a paritary representation of 
women. 
Finally, the Federal Council's argument that denies 
women a minority status is simplistic; a political mi-
nority can be a dominated majority of the population 
as the Apartheid example suffices to show. 
iii. The absence of a counter-project 
It is regrettable on such an important issue that the 
federal authorities refused .. to present a counter-
proposal to the vote. It is also quite unfortunate to 
have invoked, as they did, administrative reasons for 
not doing so. In fact, this omission reveals a deeper 
rejection of any more flexible form of quotas. 
One potential counter-proposal could have been the 
National Council's parliamentary initiative, proposed 
in August 199740 ; this initiative offered a middle 
pathway in suggesting the imposition of a one third 
quota of women in the parties' electoral lists, rather 
than specifying the number of women elected. 
This flexible counter-proposal would have intro-
duced a proportionate restriction to the. principle of 
equality of art. 8 par. 3 phr. 1 Cst. It would also have 
had the merit of reflecting what has been done in 
other European countries, and above all France. It 
would have been less stringent than the French parity 
act of 6th June, 2000, that requires that candidate lists 
4° FF 1998 p. 4157 ff. 
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contain an equal number of men and women. It is in-
teresting to note that a proposal for 50% list quota was 
nearly adopted by the National Council, but that the 
list quota of a third was regarded as a compromise so-
lution that would rally more votes. One wonders 
whether such a compromise, that does not reflect the 
true representation of women in the population, might 
not have constituted a more unequal response to ma-
terial inequality than no corrective at all. 
The Council of States - where women are underrep-
resented - and the Federal Council had several argu-
ments against a counter-proposal of flexible list quotas. 
First, they contended that parties could take more ef-
ficient measures in favour of women without restric-
tions the liberty of choice of electors. Secondly, list 
quotas would force women to present themselves as 
candidates without really wanting to. Finally, list quo-
tas would limit too stringently the liberty of choice of 
parties in small cantons, which have a very small rep-
resentation. 
These arguments again favor the free market solu-
tion to the political underrepresentation of women. 
They also ignore the temporary and flexible nature of 
list quotas· the latter allow for adaptation and will very 
quickly show how many capable women are eligible 
when they are called for, as one can see in France. 
iv. The popular verdict 
On 12th March, 2000, 82% of the people and all can-
tons41 rejected the initiative. Half of the votes were 
41 In the Swiss federal system, initiatives that call for a consti-
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presumably women's votes. Such a strong reaction 
against quotas, even rigid ones, is very surprising. 
Read together with the popular rejection of the project 
of a Federal Maternity Law in 1999, this verdict 
amounts to a defeat for many women rights' activists 
and a certain form of legal feminism. It also raises in-
teresting questions about furthering of fundamental 
rights through semi-direct democratic procedures 
which I cannot discuss here for lack of space. 
b. The Case Law 
Faced with the controversial nature of positive 
measures in the general regime of equality and the 
reluctance of federal authorities to institute a system 
of quotas in the composition of the federal political 
organs, many have put their hopes in the cantonal ex-
perience and the federal judicial review of its constitu-
tionality. Eventually, these judicial decisions might 
turn into a corpus of Swiss positive action law, as they 
did in American and European law. 
Disappointing as it is, however, there have not so far 
been many judicial decisions on the issue. Nothing at 
all has been said, for instance, of the constitutionality 
of positive measures taken by private agents. Regard-
ing public measures and political quotas in particular, 
the federal case-law amounts so far to two decisions. 
tutional amendment must be accepted by a double majority, i.e. 
a majority of cantons and citizens. 
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i. The 'arr~t soleurois' 
In its decision of 19th March, 1997, the Federal Tri-
bunal declared unconstitutional the popular initiative 
'For an equal representation of women and men in the 
cantonal authorities' presented in the canton of So-
leure. 42 This initiative called for the introduction of 
rigid quotas of seats. 
The Federal Tribunal's decision is based on two main 
·arguments. 
First, tlie apparent contradiction between the two 
facets ofequality guaranteed in art. 4 par. 2 aCst. calls 
for a weighing and balancing in each case in order to 
establish the respect of the principle of proportional-
ity. To be proportional, a measure must be capable of 
reaching its aim (material equality), constitute a nec-
essary means to do so and be the least restrictive 
measure of the fundamental individual right to formal 
equality. In this case, however, ev~n if the measures 
aimed at more material equality, they were too restric-
tive of formal equality. The Federal Tribunal followed 
the distinction then developed - and since then re-
vised - by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the 
Kalanke<l3 decision between equality of opportunity 
and equality of results. The quotas foreseen in. the 
42 ATF 123 I 152, SJ 1997 656*. 
43 Decision C-450/93, Kalanke c. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, 
Rec. 1995 Ip. 3051. Note, however, thatKalanke deals with posi-
tive measures that apply to the hirin,g process in the public ser-
vice rather than with political quotas : BUSER/POLEDNA, Poli-
tische Quoten auf dem Schafott-Reflexionen zum Bundes-
gerichtsurteil zur 'Solothurner Quoteninitiative', PJA 1211997 p. 
981 ff., 988 ; BIGLER-EGGENBERGER/KAUFMANN, above n. 6, n. 170. 
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initiative aimed at equality of results, without taking 
into account the capacities and qualifications of the 
candidates and without limiting the measures in time, 
thus violating the principle of proportionality. 
Second, the quotas system would prevent a person 
from being elected only because of her gender. This 
decision has been widely criticized and rightly so. 
First, the critique of the artificial nature of the 
Kalanke distinction between equality of opportunity 
and equality of results can be extended to its applica-
tion in Swiss law.44 The principle of material equality 
guaranteed by art. 8 par. 3 Cst. does not allow to dis-
tinguish clearly between the measures that promote 
equality of . the opportunity that ensure results and 
those which merely protect 'starting gate' equality; 
equality of opportunity cannot exclude all concern for 
results and cannot be defined as a purely procedural 
requirement.45 Art. 8 par. 3 Cst. cannot therefore 
found the unconstitutionality of measures that pro-
mote equality of results.46 
Second, the application of the principle of propor-
tionality by the Federal Tribunal is too rigid. Given the 
44 Against the validity of the Kalanke ruling In Swiss law : 
EPINEYIREFAIL, above n. 17, p. 186 f.; BIGLER-EGGENBERGER M., 
Quoten als notwendiges Mittel zur Gleichstellung, NZZ 16.2.1996 
p.15. 
45 FREDMAN, above n. 3, p. 579 ff.; WILLIAMS B., The Idea of 
Equality, In: Laslett/Runclman {eds), Philosophy, Politics and So-
ciety, Oxford 1962, p. 110 ff., 125 f. See also HANGARTNER, above 
n. 29, p. 1558. 
46 See EPINEYIREFAIL, above n. 17, p. 186; EPINEY A., 
Chancengleichheit iiber das Ergebnis ?, PJA 6/1997 p. 1033 ff.; 
BUSERIPOLEDNA, above n. 43, p. 989. 
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temporary and often experimental nature of positive 
measures, the 'necessity condition' for proportionality 
blocks any progress in the matter.47 The changes in 
American jurisprudence48, as well as the ECJ's position 
on the German exception clauses in Marschall49 allow 
us to nourish some hopes regarding the benefits of a 
strict standard of proportionality when controlling the 
validity of positive measures. This new standard ac-
knowledges that, applied too loosely, it would be noth-
ing more than an empty formula. This strict applica-
tion of .the principle will, however, be tempered by the 
fact that it is only one element among others control-
ling the constitutionality of positive measures. 50 
Finally, the decision was made while the Federal As-
sembly was wrestling with the 3rd March Initiative. 
This sole fact should have dictated a more cautious 
approach on the part of the Federal Tribunal toward 
both the federal and the cantonal democratic process, 
especially since art. 8 par. 3 phr. 2 Cst.'s mandate is a 
mandate to the legislator only.51 . 
ii. The 'arr~t uranais' 
In its second decision, the 'Uranais' decision of 7th 
October, 1998, the Federal Tribunal has adopted a 
more nuanced position on the unconstitutionality of 
·47 See AUER, above n. 2, p. 1347 f.; SCHWANDER CLAUS, above 
n. 29, p. 97; 146 ff.; SCHWANDER, above n. 20, p. 978. 
48 Decision Adarand Constructors Inc v. Pena, 115 SCt 2097, 
2119 (1995). 
49 Decision C-409/95, Hellmut Marschalf/Land Nordrhein-
Wesifalen, Rec .. 1997 Ip. 6363. 
50 See TOBLER, above n. 24, p. 112 f. 
51 See AUERIMARTENET, above n. 14, p. 651. 
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political quotas. 52 This decision dealt with a popular 
initiative that called for a larger representation of 
women in the political institutions of the canton of Uri. 
This initiative requires that, in direct popular elec-
tions political parties must present candidate lists with 
an equal number of men and women and in indirect 
elections, i.e. elections by intermediary representa-
tives, at least one third of the elected authorities 
should be women. 
First, concerning the representation or list quotas in 
direct elections, the Federal Tribunal argued that the 
fact that the project did not foresee a fixed set of seats 
for candidates of each gender, but merely enhanced 
the chances of being elected for candidates of the un-
derrepresented gender by requiring list quotas, played 
in favour of the validity of the initiative. In other 
words, list or representation quotas that are more 
flexible than seats quotas are not a priori unconstitu-
tional, provided they respect the principle of propor-
tionality. 
Second, concerning the seats quotas in indirect 
elections, the Federal Tribunal concluded that the rule 
according to which, in indirectly elected authorities, 
each sex must be represented by at least one third 
promotes the equality of opportunity. It is not a priori 
contrary to the principle of equality between men and 
women because, despite establishing seats quotas, it is 
a flexible measure that allows, on the one hand, for a 
certain margin of appreciation on the part of cantonal 
institutions and, on the other, for the respect of the 
52 ATF 125 I 21 (nt). 
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right to vote and be elected, since the election at stake 
here is an indirect one. 
In accepting that the citizens of Uranais be allowed 
to vote about this project, the Federal Tribunal has 
acknowledged that quotas are not a priori contrary to 
the Constitution and to the principle of proportional-
ity, even when they aim at ensuring equality of results. 
By doing so, it has reinterpreted and refined, without 
acknowledging it, its own 'arret soleurois', with regard 
to the material equality of opportunity proportionality. 
This effort of moderation by the Federal Tribunal to-
wards the cantons' initiative results, on the one hand, 
from the respect it owes to ongoing democratic proce-
dures and, on the other hand, from the simultaneous 
change of jurisprudence of the ECJ and the Tribunal's 
efforts to render Swiss law 'eurocompatible'. 
IV. PERSPECTIVES FOR CHANGE 
After the very strong popular rejection of political 
quotas in 2000 in the absence of an official counter-
project and given the lack of flexibility one may ob-
serve in federal case-law, future perspectives for the 
adoption of political quotas, even flexible list quotas or 
paritary rights a la.fran9aise, are bleak. 
This situation is very surprising given that such quo-
tas are needed and would fit perfectly coherently with 
the existing guarantees of the principle of equality, the 
constitutional mandate to the legislator for the promo-
tion of material equality, the existing programmes of 
positive action in the educational and industrial 
realms, and other institutions such as the federal sys-
tem of proportional representation of cantons, parties 
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and languages. In fact, when the Swiss proportional 
representative system and its differentiated regime of 
material equality between men and women are com-
pared with the French unitary and universalist regime, 
the rejection of quotas of representation, even rigid 
ones, by the federal authorities and the Swiss people is 
not only difficult to understand, but even paradoxical. 
There are two possible explanations. First, that 
Swiss public opinion, which took until 1971 to accept 
women's right to vote and be elected, was simply not 
yet ready for a rigid intervention in favour of women; 
patience and constant dialogue are irt order in a semi-
direct democracy like Switzerland, which is not sus-
ceptible to the so-called 'cunning of reason' on the 
French model. 53 A second reason may be that the quo-
tas proposed in the 3n1 March initiative, and the 'So-
leurois' initiative sanctioned by the Federal Tribunal, 
were all rigid quotas of results or seats. 
Concretely, the hope now for advocates of paritary 
rights is that notwithstanding strong. public opposition 
to rigid quotas, the debate about more flexible 50% list 
quotas or paritary rights in federal institutions can still 
be raised again. Such a debate is likely to be triggered 
by the fact that the numerous revisions of the can-
tonal constitutions that are now taking place deal·with 
the issue. 54 These revisions could play their traditional 
53 See KRIEGEL B.; Parite et princlpe d'egalite, in: Sur le prin- · 
cipe d'egalite, rapport public 1996, Conseil d'Etat, La documenta-
tion fram;alse, Etudes et Documents, n° 48, Paris 1997. 
s4 See, for Instance, the new Constitution of the Canton of 
Neuchiitel (FF 2001 III 2355), which in its art. 8 par. 2 phr. 2 
mentions the right to an equal access to the public function. 
This seems to indicate that it could for instance be used to found 
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role as 'constitutional laboratories' in a federal sys-
tem. ss 
As long as there are no federal rules on the matter 
. . , 
however, cantonal legislative initiatives and constitu-
tional revisions will have to satisfy either the constitu-
tional review of the Federal Tribunal or the approval 
and guarantee of the Federal Assembly. Let us hope 
therefore that, given the absence of consensus over the 
issue, both institutions will respect cantons' constitu-
tional autonomy and innovations and their democratic 
process that is protected by art. 8 par. 3 phr. 2 Cst. 
Positive experiences with more flexible list quotas at 
the cantonal level might then generate enough enthu-
siasm and conviction among parties at the federal 
level for some of them to launch another initiative for 
the introduc. tion of flexible list quotas, either a parlia-
mentary initiative for the 2003 federal elections or a 
new popular initiative for the constitutional imposition 
of a 50% list quota of women with equal precedence on 
the lists. 
Theoretically now, even in such a material model of 
equality, it is best, given the competing right to formal 
equality of third parties and the dangers of perpetuat-
ing stereotypes that the quotas one proposes remain 
fletJCible. Although this essay advocates better represen-
tation for women, it argues that the best strategic ap-
proach to proportional representation is contextual 
. flexible list quotas and paritary rights a la fram;iaise. 
ss See AUER A., Les constitutions cantonales: une source ne-
gligee du droit constitutionnel suisse, ZBI. 1990 p. 14 ff. 
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andfluid, in the image of the new equilibrium that has 
been reached in the recent American and European 
case-law.56 
First of all, quotas should only be temporary. They 
must be revised regularly and abrogated as soon as 
their objectives of material equality have been 
reached. 57 One should be prepared to recognize and 
respond to the new political dynamic created. by the 
presence of both men and women in political organs. 
Second, positive measures must respect other fun-
damental rights. 58 When they infringe other rights, 
positive measures must at least satisfy the conditions 
of restriction of those rights, such as the requirement 
of a legal basis, the existence of a public interest and 
the respect of the principle of proportionality. 59 Thus, 
in principle, rigid quotas of representation will tend to 
be less proportionate than flexible tie-break or list 
quotas which take the qualifications of the candidates 
into account and leave some place for an overall 
evaluation. 
Third, positive measures must be established from 
case to case by taking into account the circumstances 
of the women they aim at promoting. For instance, 
qua remedy to inequality, quotas should aim at re-
specting and representing the parity between men and 
56 See for a survey of the case-law and a discussion of this new 
asymmetric equilibrium, BESSON, above n. 5. 
57 See SCHWANDER CLAUS, above n. 29, p 149. 
58 See SCHWANDER, above n. 20, p. 977 f. 
59 See AUER, above n. 2, p. 1347. See also FREDMAN, above n. 
3, p. 600; MCCRUDDEN, above n. 4, p. 242. 
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women in the population; any other repartition than a 
50% quota would lose this original justification, as the 
French example shows. 
Finally, quotas and other measures promoting.equal-
ity of results constitute nothing more than an illusion 
without the accompaniment of enabling measures of 
promoting equality of opportunity, which by them-
selves are unlikely to have a real impact. A policy of 
equality of opportunity that is in conformity with art. 
8 par. 3 phr. 2 Cst. requires an important investment 
of resources, in particular in education. and training. A 
two-pronged strategy combining measures that take 
care of starting points and positive measures that aim 
at results will help to realize the mate equality of 
women that traditional anti-discriminatory laws have 
not been able to achieve so far. 
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